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ABSTRACT: A warrant may be grounded in personal testimony, technical method, or public consensus.
The justified choice of a field, in authorizing the warrant and providing further extension of support
constitutes a legitimation inference. Complex cases evolve when there are a surplus of good reasons as
potential support for a claim, and a choice must be made either to select a single ground for the claim or to
advance independently valid reasons, differentially grounded, as support. Complex cases enter the realm of
controversy when not all relevant grounds offer the same degree of support or point in the same direction,
and a choice to select some grounds and discard others must be justified. The justification of the selection
of grounds constitutes a legitimation warrant—a missing element of the Toulmin model.
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INTRODUCTION
The Toulmin model (1958, 2003) opened the door to the recovery of practical reason, the
development of informal logic, and the advances of critical thinking into the realms of the
everyday uses of argument. An alternative to positivistic reasoning, the model provided a
basic outline that called attention to the ordinary communicative practices that lend
support to claims for a reason. This intuitive idea of argumentation is at the basis of
Habermas’s own notion of the ‘form of argumentation’ where: ‘We try to support a claim
with good grounds or reasons; the quality of the reasons and their relevance can be called
into question by the other side; we meet objections and are in some cases forced to
modify our original positions’ (1981, p. 31). Thus, Habermas follows Toulmin into more
complex observations, reaffirming the distinctions between the general schema of
reasoning which is more or less field invariant and the much more elaborate ‘fielddependent rules of argumentation which are constitutive for the language games or lifeorders of law, medicine, science, politics, art criticism, business enterprise, sport, and so
on’ (pp. 31-32). To appreciate an argument, then, it is necessary to understand the sort of
enterprise ‘that is supposed to be advanced through argumentation,’ and to appreciate the
enterprise, one follows the rules of thumb of argument general to all practical
engagements and special to the authorized moves and certified standards of a field.
The fields of argument explored by Toulmin, Rieke and Janik include science,
law, management, art criticism, and ethics (1979, pp. 203-338). The fields are said to
differ along ‘varied’ constellations of complex procedures. The categories for assessing
the requirements of argument for fields include: (l) degrees of formality ranging from
informal turn taking to ritual advocacy, (2) degrees of precision ranging from
mathematical exactitude to more common ball park estimates, (3) alternative
requirements for completion or resolution that range from mutual agreement producing
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consensus to impartial judgment effecting a verdict, (4) diverse goals that are linked to
‘what is at stake within the forum involved’ (p. 198). In this last respect, the goals of
argument will reflect the ‘general purposes’ and ‘practical demands’ placed upon
argument by the practices of a field and the objectives of the interlocutors. It is at this
juncture that Habermas raises an objection, namely that Toulmin ‘doesn’t draw the proper
lines between accidental institutional differentiations of argumentation, on the one hand,
and the forms of argumentation determined by internal structure on the other’ (35). In
other words, the categories of formality, precision, resolution mode, and purpose are
insufficient descriptors to differentiate between those ‘validity claims’ (assertions of the
worthiness of an argument to be trusted) that are grounded in routines of practices and
those that are core to sustaining the integrity of an institution or form of life. At this point,
Habermas leaves field theory behind and introduces his own well-known theory that
differentiates argumentation into theoretical, practical, aesthetic, therapeutic, and
explicative discourse and critique (1981, p. 23). The advantage of Habermas’s system is
that it properly weights the validity and proof requirements of each form of
argumentation.
The purpose of this paper is to extend the original Toulmin model, with its
intuitive focus on practice, and its tantalizing promise to find grounds for practical
reasoning in the warrant-using and warrant establishing work of reasoning authorized by
the forms and practices of reasoning within fields. I will argue, contra Habermas, that
argumentation is best served by repairing rather than abandoning Toulmin’s field
grounded reasoning. The major repair I offer is the addition of ‘legitimation inferences,’
that is. justifications of the selection of backing to support a given argument. I will
endeavor to show how the addition of such a component permits analysis of complex
cases where grounds may or may not point unequivocally in a single direction. Finally,
the modern predicament between practical and technical reasoning will be explored
around the issue of risk in order to illustrate the uses of the repaired Toulmin model in
exploring contemporary controversy. In the end, the Toulmin model repaired to take into
account legitimation inferences may help answer Habermas’s objection that Toulmin’s
field analysis cannot differentiate between essential and accidental features of a field in
authorizing a warrant.
1. LEGITIMATION INFERENCES
The Toulmin model is missing a critical component: a legitimation warrant. Unnoticed by
any of its many interpreters, readers and critics, Toulmin is able to convincingly make the
case that the selection of grounds for establishing a warrant or support is a natural
connection between argument and context (1958, 103). Indeed, in Toulmin, Janik and
Rieke, the choice of the grounds for an argument is circularly defined because an
argument and its purpose are the same thing: legal reasoning contextualizes legal
argument, the purpose of ethical argument is an ethical decision, and so forth (1979). The
problem with this notion is that it begs the question as to why any specific argued-claim
is legitimately appropriate, judicable, proper, or even relevant to a given field. Further,
since practitioners can borrow standards analogically from another field, or supplement
the reasoning of one field with the arguments of another (presumption moves from the
law to science in setting proof standards), the establishment of a claim within the ambit of
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a field does not always establish what standards of argumentation offer proper
certification. The justification of a decision to ground a particular argument in a field I
have called elsewhere a ‘legitimation inference’ (1991).
The choice of backing to certify the authority of a warrant requires a special kind
of inference. Like any other part of the model, the choice of grounding is criticizable; yet,
the selection of backing is not another item of support, a warrant in itself, a reservation,
qualifier, or claim. When called upon to justify the crucial choice to develop an argument
out of a certain interpretation of the authority, relevance, and acceptability of a field, an
interlocutor is required to show sufficient and necessary reasons for the selection of that
field—that is to legitimate the assumed or explicit connection. In a warrant-using
argument, legitimation inferences impart sufficient reasons for the selection of a field to
ground and develop support, warrants, qualifiers and reservations. In a warrantestablishing argument, legitimation is a complicated process that balances competing
choices among fields in the interests of rendering an overall judgment that the
connections among grounding and backing, while somewhat novel, are none the less
reasonable.
Typically, the legitimation inferences are left in the background. There are
different reasons for this, depending upon whether a ‘field’ is constellated as informal
practices of communicative reasoning, professional decision-making, or political
advocacy. In everyday argumentation, we disagree with one another without having
recourse to either an etiquette coach or a rule book, because it is appropriate to ground
our discussion in the informal conventions of conversation and common opinion. In a
court of law, the formidable symbolism, rituals, trained advocates and justices of the
forum itself all collaborate to put on a trial where reasons tend toward questions of
justice. Likewise in other forums, from science to religion, the rules of reasoning appear
as immanent within a situated discourse, and the situation a product of the practices,
procedures, and issues of the interlocutors. Finally, in politics, the nature of a deliberation
grounds discussion in questions of power and expediency by virtue of the time toward
which decisions are tending to come to a vote or a head. In other words, the social rules,
institutional fora, and eventfulness of argument offer cues to the field from which reasons
should be developed and from which standards should be borrowed to inform tests of
reasoning or the outcomes of judgment. The personal, technical, and public fields within
which the same (or similar) claims may be grounded suggest that the deliberative
exigencies of situated argument are typically enmeshed in complex case making. The
following section distinguishes complex cases that evolve from warrant-using
argumentation, and those that typically evolve warrant-establishing reasons.
2. THE COMPLEX CASE
A complex case is a situated argument where the settlement of a disagreement depends
upon the resolution of multiple points of disagreement. This section divides complex
cases into two types. In Type I complex cases the process of reasoning is well established
and shaped into coherent case-making. Such cases equate the procedure of arguing with
the essential nature of the enterprise and reflect warrant-using strategies. Type II complex
cases are those that cobble together justifications for assembling a complex set of
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reasons, drawn from diverse fields, to support deliberative reasoning. These cases do not
rest on any inherent equation of form and purpose, snd often give rise to novelty.
2.1 Type 1 Complex Cases
Classical rhetoric defines the complex case in terms of stasis theory. Questions of fact are
deployed around a contested conjectural stasis. Questions of definition are procedurally
argued through a definitional stasis. Questions of the justice or expediency of the act are
argued through a qualitative stasis. And questions of jurisdiction fall under a translative
stasis (Stasis, 2005). In the classical paradigm, the levels of disputation distribute the
burden of proof, so that to affirm the guilt of an accused a prosecution needs to establish
the preponderance of evidence at all levels, while the defense needs only to successfully
wage dispute on one. As is well known, should the facts, definition, quality, or place not
be successfully established, a case cannot be made; on the other hand, should all of these
claims be put in order, then the force of reason places a demand for a ruling by a judge
and a call to render a verdict by the jury. Indeed, in discussion prior to trial, a judge may
inquire of potential jurors as to whether they are capable of making decisions upon
weighted evidence and of following basic rules of rational conduct presupposed by the
jurisprudential model of argument. Such a model offers a complex case insofar as
multiple issues are potentially in play any time the prospect of a legal dispute arises;
participants in the trial are trained to see in the particular case a field of potential
arguments weighted and categorized along the lines of potential issues for an overall
contest between positions; and a mode of coming to terms with the diverse issues is
invested in a procedure that makes sense on its face.
The complex case constituted by forensic stasis is an exception to, rather than a
paradigm of, everyday argumentation, where decisions of choice and expediency, means
and ends, risks and outcomes prevail. In every situation where probable argument is in
play, there is no assurances that (l) there will be a finite number of levels at which
arguments may statiate, (2) that all engaged in a dispute will agree upon criteria of
relevance to discern what issues need to be resolved, or even discussed, to properly
resolve an issue, and (3) that, even should there be an agreement as to relevance, the
claims involved will bind together in such a neat way as to distribute the burdens of
proof, determine sides of an argument, and provide a coherent route to adjudication. Nor
is it even the case that a normative model of deliberation that prescribes levels of stases
for rendering sound, practical judgments will get the advocates closer to a resolution.
In practical argumentation, models have focused on evolving various schemes that
appear as a fitting counterpart to forensic stasis. One common model is the ill-solution
paradigm. In making a choice about medical care, one needs to know: if there is an
illness, how serious it is, what the cause of the illness is (to discover if there are any
incidental changes that would eliminate the problem), the effectiveness of a cure, and
whether side-effects would do more harm than the solution good. This complex case is
like forensic stasis insofar as it offers a coherent, reasonable model of argument that aims
at a decision by distributing the burden of proof. Just as in forensics, if there is any one of
the levels of the claims cannot be established, there is no reason to go forward with a
positive judgment.
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The difference that is lurking here is that, whereas the question of justice is
constitutive of reaching a legal decision, the complex case underwriting public
deliberation is analogical. In Habermas’s terms with which we began, the illness-cure
model is an accident or variation on deliberative reasoning, whereas forensic stases are
constitutive of justice. Indeed, the medical model is not necessarily appropriate to
political activity, and itself rests on the unexamined bias at the bottom of Western
medicine as a field: ‘do no harm.’ One can imagine a prudential model of complex casemaking that would see government as an initiator of action, with a duty to search out and
mitigate social problems, where outcomes were in the interests of compensation for past
wrongs, present inequities, or future legitimacy—rather than merely move to eliminate a
particular problem when it makes us uncomfortable enough to be seen as an ‘ill.’ In other
words, the model of deliberation—the narrative within which case-construction is
articulated—is not a necessary part of deliberative argument, but only a preference to
frame a context in a particular way in the service of an overall view of how deliberation
best proceeds for citizens.
2.2 Type II complex cases
In a pluralistic society, deliberation is complicated because the contexts within which
arguments are made are not obvious, authoritative, or relevant to all who have a right to a
say in a deliberation. Type II complex cases typically engage what Toulmin calls
‘warrant-establishing’ arguments. In such cases, it is not enough to determine the likely
truth or falsity of a well-established series of claims that regulate the production of proof
and inference bearing upon a claim. The act of placing a claim within a given field
requires assembling a case where more than one ground that must be addressed. The
relative weighting of different grounds in an overall decision makes for quite complex
deliberative argument, indeed. If complexity offers less security in linking argument to
grounds, it also offers the potential benefit of forming a more robust consensus--more on
this later.
At this point, I would like to enter a simple example to illustrate the use of
legitimation inferences in an instance of complex case-making.
Suppose that you are at the pharmacy and are evaluating the reasons that go into a
decision to take a product Nexium, to fight ‘acid reflux disease.’ At a personal level, you
have what seems like an upset stomach, hoping that the pain signals digestion issues with
‘something you ate,’ (+l) but aware that there are worse maladies that afflict others in
your family (-1). At another level, you are aware of the chemistry of traditional remedies
for gas (+l), but also interested in the ability of research to provide more effective ‘relief’
(-1). At a third level, you have heard a congressional investigation condemn ‘direct to
market advertising’ (-1) as preying upon the gullible but you are also aware that the FDA
regulates efficacy (+1). Do you buy ‘Nexium’ or not? How do the arguments ‘add up’ in
deliberating a reasonable decision?
A complex case could be rendered by simply adding and subtracting positive and
negative reasons, and a reasonable purchase could be defined by the preponderance of
affirmative or negative evidence. Probability theory would render calculations somewhat
more complex should the degree of confidence be measured in the strength of an
affirmative or negative judgment, but the principle of determining the outcome would be
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relatively the same. Indeed, should all the reasons for or against a claim be vectored in
the same direction, then a decision is rendered transparent: it would not make sense to
ignore the conclusion. If all the reasons favored Nexium or all the reasons were opposed
to the decision, then further deliberation is not necessary.
Deliberation is never in principle a closed matter, however, and the search for
disconfirming or countervailing reasons may continue. In the above example, one might
introduce questions of price and availability of resources at the end of an evening; so a
lack of available cash might settle the argument. A consensus emerges, however, when
all claims at the different levels of argumentation independently support a central claim.
Purchasing Nexium is a good idea because of personal experience, technical information,
systemic trust, and financial availability. What happens, however, when the field of
argument relevant to a reasoned decision fails to become transparent?
A genuinely complex case arises where reasons point in multiple, relevant,
different directions in supporting and contesting a claim that must be resolved before a
reasonable decision can be rendered. This complexity forces a reasoner into a secondorder set of questions about the comparative relationship among the grounds that are
positioned in support of or opposition to the claim. Questions arise as to the relative
weight of reasons that point independently in opposite directions. Even the assumed
independence of relationships among independently grounded reasons, relating to the
case, may come into question.
The comparison of relative weight among alternative grounds arises most often
when a single ground does not provide a self-evident context and a reasoner is forced to
think over what groundings are fitting for the specific choice in question. Such reflection
is provoked when multiple support is available, conflicting and relatively equal in
attributed rational force. Thus, whether to rely on personal experience, technical
reasoning or public trust opens a question in a particular case, where advice conflicts, as
to what constitutes a legitimate decision.
Formally, two kinds of arguments apply: first, why a particular ground should be
discounted as non-determinative in the decision; second, why a particular ground (or
combination of grounds) should trump countervailing argumentation. The preference for
and discounting of alternative grounds for argumentation ideally should be isomorphic,
but may not be the same. When the preferences for one kind of ground over another
becomes a rule that is generally applied, then a complex case may be said to have evolved
through a ‘warrant-establishing’ argument; namely, reasons have been discovered for
settling a claim in a conflicted context. These warrant-establishing warrants may or may
not form authoritative precedents for selecting one sort of grounds over another in
situations of a particular type.
Complex case-making of this sort (Type II) occupies a substantial portion of
everyday argumentation in pluralistic societies, I believe, because modern living is
suffused with a surplus of reasons for decision, and deliberation requires sorting through
the multiple sources that aspire to guide, if not determine, the grounds upon which
rational conduct is deliberated. The routine requirements of complex case-making are
well illustrated in contrasting the personal field of risk assessment, prudential reasoning,
as compared to its technical counterpart in science. The question of how to square
practical and scientific justifications when they evolve as opposing grounds for a decision
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is a core question of deliberation within the practice of everyday life as well as a site for
the continuing evolution of controversy.
3. RISK AND LEGITIMATION CONTROVERSY
A traditional view of practical decision-making involves the element of chance or fortune
in all decisions. Chance is that element of a decision that speaks to a gap between our
grounded expectations and the actual outcome of an endeavor. The practice of
deliberative argument assumes that humans are fallible, that they make errors and can
learn from mistakes by sifting causes and consequences relating choice to activity. The
element of chance recognizes that in spite of the best reasons, outcomes of actions can
exceed or disappoint expectations. The intervention of chance into human affairs creates
a deliberative space where risks can be appraised and evaluated, their consequences
anticipated and hedged. Type I cases emerge when a deliberation draws upon a single
field to make a case for taking a chance; Type II cases emerge when multiple fields are in
play, offering something less than commensurable reasons.
3.1 Traditional views of practical reason acknowledge that chance intervenes into human
affairs. There are three elements that always accompany portrayals of the goddess Tyche
(luck for the Greeks) and Fortuna (fortune for the Romans). The goddess is displayed
holding a cornucopia, representing abundance, standing on a stream or a ball, indicating
impermanence, and near a rudder, indicating steering or intent. The symbolic field is
rather unambiguous insofar as the elements of luck enter into human actions in the
pursuit of fruitful enterprises. Occasionally, fortune is blind, representing that she is
indifferent to whether the person pursuing an end is deserving or not; at other times,
fortune is shown by a wheel, cautioning or encouraging reasoners that chance has its up
and down cycles. The goddess of fortune has been figured as present at great events such
as battles or at smaller ones, featuring natality. In any event, the relation between risk and
reason appears to be a staple acknowledgement in the Western tradition. Douglas and
Wildavsky (1983) argue that all notions of risk are culturally bound. So the limits of
practical reasoning occasioned by fortune have underwritten the limits of prudential
reasoning and conduct for millennia.
3.2 Prudential argumentation counsels that fortune visits those who are prepared, who do
not take incautious risks, who learn from experience, and who draw from general wisdom
to guide principles of conduct. In everyday argumentation, risks are evaluated from the
standpoint of personal experience—not from an objective calculus. Experience with risks,
the intensity of revulsion to a bad outcome, bad publicity and personal preference all
combine to make up a cautionary field where rules are evolved to guide whether an action
should be undertaken or a choice made. While preferences may vary, some risks can be
avoided, others can be framed as not worth taking, and a few may constitute appropriate
gambits, if losses are not important or could be recouped. A common sense approach to
risk-taking depends upon practical reasoning to draw from the field of experience a
connection between cause and effect of an action, thus advising whether or not a risk
should be taken. Further, our understanding of risk provides a mode of reception for
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unplanned events that are either windfalls or downfalls, depending on the circumstances.
When fortune intervenes, little can be done.
3.3 Modernity has changed the reasoning through which risk is appraised. Multiple
scientific models now underwrite the scientific assessment of risk (Renn, 1992). Science
makes the appraisal of risk in relation to deliberation quite difficult by introducing
relatively unique, even counterintuitive, measures of understanding. Several of these will
be mentioned.
3.3.1 Latency is the idea that a risk may be encountered at some point and its
harms only evolve years later. Latency removes the idea that risks are knowable at the
time they are encountered and that precautions can be taken in a timely fashion.
3.3.2 Multiple causality is the idea that no one factor may engender a risk, but that
a combination of unique circumstances may accumulate so as to bring about an
undesirable set of affairs. Thus, to eliminate one potential cause of a problem (smoking)
may do nothing for another (genetic predisposition). In many cases, to solve one cause of
a problem may cause other undesirable risks.
3.3.3 Threshold reasoning argues that low-level risks may remain without
consequence for years, only to suddenly accumulate at an unknown point to cross the line
into a harmful condition. A car may travel for many miles with proper maintenance
before a crucial part suddenly gives way. In some cases, the direction of activity that
approaches a harmful threshold is not known.
3.3.4 Uncertainty is a measure of probability of success or failure of a chosen
outcome. A general domain of uncertainty, however, says nothing about the individual
case. When making a decision, say, to have a medical procedure, the range of estimates
must somehow be translated into individual judgments. Further, uncertainty itself rests on
the unknown; that is, any scientific probability is only valid in the limited sense that it has
yet to be disproved by other factors yet to be taken into account and potentially relevant.
3.4 Complex cases evolve where practical reasoning and scientific reasoning are both
relevant to a decision, but neither is determinative. In many, if not most, cases a particular
claim may find internally contradictory evidence within the field of personal risk-taking
and within the field of science too. In such a complex case, the choice of which
arguments within field X to compare with contrary arguments in the field Y+Z creates the
potential for thorough-going controversy. At a minimum, if practical and scientific
reasoning conflict, the choice to ground a risk decision in one field or the other has to be
accounted for in the specific case. In a case of maximum controversy, the configurations
of practical, scientific, and political reasons from alternative fields create a complex case
that balances the argumentative force of fields (and subfields) against one another. The
legitimation inferences that evolve to subordinate one field to another, discounting
opposing reasons, create new warrants for argumentation or involve interlocutors in the
painful process of finding no reasonable guidance to crucial questions. Legitimation
inferences that set precedents reconfigure the relationships among fields, or the
contestation within and among fields, by answering the question of justified choice
among the grounds of reason.
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CONCLUSION
In the beginning of the essay, I promised to redeem Toulmin from the criticism of
Habermas by showing how the Toulmin model could be adapted to seek out those
argumentative situations where standards for reasoning essential to a field evolve. This
can be done, but only if the model is made sensitive to the crucial area of justification that
constitutes a legitimation inference. The justification of a choice of grounds forces
reflection upon why a specific backing should count in this case, for this choice, in a
specific deliberative context. Subjecting the constellating body of authority to scrutiny
generates a justification for that particular field, as an essential guideline to authorizing a
warrant as credible, trustworthy, reliable, or believable. Thus, the choice of field
grounding permits discrimination between relevant grounding and accidental features of
an enterprise. Tables were turned on Habermas’s own view of argumentation that rests
reasoning in distinct categories by virtue of independent sources of validity claims. It is
true, that cases that are rendered complex by multiple reasons may be simplified by
constitutive stases, as in questions of justice. On the other hand, in deliberation, complex
cases evolve because personal, technical and political fields may all be relevant but point
in alternative directions. The arena of risk was explored to illustrate the challenge of
evolving coherent justifications for combinatory grounds in making important choices in
modern life. In the end, argumentation theorists are called to study controversies where
the unsettled relationships among fields and good decisions give rise to arguments over
the appropriate choice or revision of backing. Such disputes engage us critically in the
study of legitimation controversies.
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